Federal Law Enforcement Brief for the 2010 Symposium on Food & Agriculture Security

Madison, Wisconsin

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U.S. Government Responsibilities

- Identify, detect, deter and disrupt terrorist operations before they occur.
- FBI primary jurisdiction to investigate, apprehend and bring to prosecution those responsible for acts of terrorism



Terrorism 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 Title 22 of USC, §2656f(d)

"... the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

"... premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."



DHS Presidential Decision Directive 9

U.S. Policy to Protect Agriculture and Food System - signed by President Bush 01/04

Identifying agriculture and food system as critical infrastructure.

Developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats.

Mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing areas.

Enhancing product screening procedures and response and recovery.



FBI Agroterrorism Programs

- 4th International Symposium on Agroterrorism
- AgroSecurity Working Groups
- Food and Agriculture Industry Outreach Booklets
- InfraGard Special Interest Groups
- Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism Initiative (SPPA)



International Symposium on Agroterrorism www.fbi-isa.org







Inaugural: May 3 – 5, 2005

2nd Year's: Sept. 25-29, 2006

3 Year's: April 22-24, 2008

Next Years's: April 26-28, 2011 Kansas City, Missouri



Goals of Symposium

- **To :**
- Prevent an Agroterrorism act in the U.S. through a coordinated intelligence process,
- Develop a response capability to neutralize and eliminate a potential attack; and,
- * Educate the appropriate disciplines in responding to threats directed at the nation's food supply.



Private Industry

Government

Science/ Academia

Law Enforcement



Health, Medical, Veterinary



Education and Awareness

Presented By:









Format of ISA

Prevention Vulnerabilities, Threats

Detection R & D, Surveillance, Lab Capabilities

Investigation Criminal, Epidemiological, NRF, Clean-up







Key Note Speakers

- Secretary, USDA
- Czar, FDA
- Secretary, DHS
- Director, FBI
- Governors
- Senators
- Representatives
- International Heads of State

International Representation 22 Countries





Analysis & Key Results of Past ISAs

Agroterrorism Scenarios



Attacks Against Agriculture and Terrorism Modus Operandi





Agroterrorism Scenarios

A number of priority risk areas have been identified

- Covert release of a highly contagious animal virus
 - Aim: Economic destablization
 - Agent: Nightmare scenario would involve Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
- Release of a communicable disease that affects both animals and humans
 - Aim: Human deaths and fear
 - Agent: For example, Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Avian Influenza (AI), Exotic Newcastle Disease (END)
- Introduction of a tasteless, odorless bacterial/toxic contaminant into the food chain
 - Aim: Human deaths, fear, economic destablization
 - Agent: e-coli, salmonella, botulism (all of which are easy to culture)



Attacks Against Agriculture and Terrorism Modus Operandi

- Attacks against agriculture unlikely to constitute a primary form of terrorist aggression
 - Lack visible, immediate effects and shock value
- Empirical record would seem to support this notion
 - Since 1912 a mere 12 documented cases involving the offensive substate use of bio agents against agriculture
 - Of which only 2 could be termed terroristic
- However, agro-terrorism has potential appeal as a secondary or diversionary mode of attack
 - Economic fall-out from a large-scale strike likely to resonate with the agenda of the contemporary international jihadist network
 - Attacks against agriculture could be used as a novel form of asymmetric warfare to exacerbate the disorienting effects of a more conventional campaign of bombings



What Have We Learned?

- Threats need to be taken seriously
- •Need a framework for response and coordination to handle large incidents
- Adequate resources and expertise
 - Determine extent of contamination and any public health implications by testing product, recalling product and alerting consumers
 - Finding the perpetrator by law enforcement capabilities





ISA 2011 April 26-28, 2011

- Between 1000-1500 attendees expected
- General Assembly/Break-out Sessions
- Case Studies
- Worldwide Information Sharing and Networking

